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RISKING IT ALL 
Lisa Heinzerling' 
Thank you for inviting me here today. I feel privileged to deliver this 
lecture honoring Daniel Meador, a beloved alumnus, former Dean, and col-
league. 
I congratulate the organizers of this year's three-part lecture series for 
choosing the topic "Risk and the Law." The topic is timely, full of rich pos-
sibilities for analysis, and as contentious as any matter in legal academics 
today. If you attend all of the lectures-mine, plus those by Professors 
Simon and Sunstein-I believe you will begin to see why issues of risk are 
so important and so hard, and I am certain you will come away with quite 
different lessons from each of us. Mine, of course, will be the least contro-
versial. 
Let me start with some facts. Before I go on, a warning: The facts I'm 
about to describe are the kinds of facts that probably led to the old joke 
about the definition of an optimist. What is an optimist, the joke goes-it's 
an environmentalist with children. They're not happy facts. 
First. Forty-eight of our states have issued advisories telling their citi-
zens to limit, or in some cases eliminate, their consumption of fish drawn 
from the rivers, lakes, and streams within their borders.! These fish adviso-
ries cover over 750,000 miles of rivers and about one-third of the lake acre-
age in the United States? A fish advisory covers all of the water in four of 
the Great Lakes3 and all of the lakes and rivers in twenty-one states.4 
Second. Almost 160 million Americans live in areas that violate the fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) new standard for ozone 
pollution.5 Where I live, in a recent summer, there were nine days, when 
ozone levels exceeded the national standard-and that was under the old, 
more lenient standard.6 When ozone levels are high, parents arrive at 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. See EPA, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH ADVISORIES I (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories/factsheet.pdf. 
2. [d. at 2. 
3. [d. 
4. [d. at 4. 
5. See Traci Watson, EPA Tells I in 7 U.S. Counties to Clean up Smog: Worst Areas Get the Most 
Time, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,2004, at AI. 
6. See Katherine Shaver, Blue Skies and Code Red: Heat Helps Create Conditions for Year's 1st 
Severe Smog Alert, WASH. POST, June 26, 2003, at B4. 
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schools and daycare centers to be greeted with notes announcing: "Code 
Red Day. Children will be playing inside today.,,7 
Third. Frogs are disappearing all over the world, in many countries, in 
all kinds of habitats, and under all kinds of conditions.8 Many people think 
frogs are the "canaries in the coal mine" of the aquatic world because of 
their special sensitivity to environmental disturbances.9 Bees, which polli~ 
nate almost 75% of the world's cultivated crops, are also disappearing. lO I 
could add many others to the list of the missing. 
Fourth. Nursing mothers in many parts of the world have disturbingly 
high concentrations of industrial chemicals in their breast milk. 11 A recent 
study of mothers in the northwestern United States found PBDEs (Polybro~ 
minated Diphenyl Ethers), a chemical used in flame retardants, in every 
woman studied.12 PBDEs have been found to have effects much like those 
of the long~banned PCBs-impaired memory and learning, altered behav~ 
ior, delayed sexual development, and altered thyroid levels. \3 Some scien~ 
tists have hypothesized that one reason why women who breastfeed their 
children have a lower risk of cancer is that they have (unwittingly) dumped 
some of their chemical load into their own babies' bodies. 14 
Fifth. Sometimes it seems that the word most commonly accompanying 
the phrase "the world's fisheries" is "collapse.,,15 Fisheries the world over 
are being depleted. Even the once~mighty cod fisheries hover on the brink 
of complete disaster. 16 Once the oceans seemed an unlimited resource; now 
we know they are not. 
Sixth. Glaciers around the world are retreating before our eyes. On Mt. 
Everest, a glacier near Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Nor~ay's first camp 
has retreated some three miles since their famous ascent. 7 The snows of 
7. See id.; Michael E. Ruane, Regionwide, Sweatin' to the '90s: Workers Pour on the Fluids; 
Students Head Home or Chill in Air-Conditioning, WASH. POST, June 12,2002, at B3. 
8. Juliet Eilperin, Worldwide Repon Says Amphibians Are in Peril: Ecological Stresses May be 
Taking Toll, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,2004, at A3; NPR's Morning Edition: Disappearing Frogs (NPR 
radio broadcast May 19, 1998), available at http://www.npr.org!programs/re/archivesdatelI998/may/ 
980519.frogs.html; Nova Scotia Museum of Natural History, Are Frogs Disappearing?, http://museum. 
gov.ns.ca/mnh/nature/frogs/gone.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
9. Eilperin, supra note 8. 
10. Arielle Levin Becker, A Plea for Nature's Pollinators: Garden's Exhibits Highlight Need to 
Protect Crucial Creatures, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at C4. 
11. See Philip J. Landrigan et aI., Chemical Contaminants in Breast Milk and Their Impacts on 
Children's Health: An Overview, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A313, A313 (2002). 
12. John Heilprin, Potentially Harmful Chemicals Increasing in Lake Michigan, Flame-Retardant 
PBDEs Show Up in Women's Breast Milk, and Have Been Banned in Europe, PHIL. iNQUIRER, Nov. 26, 
2004, at A23. 
13. See Kim Hooper & Jianwen She, Lessonsfrom the Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDEs): 
Precautionary Principle, Primary Prevention, and the Value of Community-Based Body-Burden Moni-
toring Using Breast Milk, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 109, 109-10 (2003). 
14. See id. at 112; see also Judy S. LaKind et ai., Infant Exposure to Chemicals in Breast Milk in the 
United States: What We Need to Learn from a Breast Milk Monitoring Program, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERsp.75 (2001) (analyzing contamination in breast milk). 
15. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 705 (2003). 
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN: THE COLLAPSE OF THE ATLANTIC COD 
FISHERY 63-64 (1999). 
17. See Stentor Danielson, Everest Melting? High Signs of Climate Change, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 
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Kilimanjaro are leaving us as well: the mountain that Hemingway once de-
scribed as "wide as all the world, great, high, and unbelievably white in the 
sun,,18 will, if current trends continue, lose its ice and snow by about 2020.19 
Seventh. Growing seasons are changing. There are more early and late 
frost events threatening disruptions to agriculture.2o Birdsong comes earlier 
in the spring, and spring flowers arrive in the winter?1 
Last. A study commissioned by the Pentagon-subtitled "Imagining the 
Unthinkable"~escribes the food and water shortages, refugee emergen-
cies, and national security crises that could occur if the climate changes 
abruptly, over the next 20 or so years, rather than gradually, over the next 
century.22 
I'll stop here so we can all finish our day without spiraling into despair. 
None of this is pleasant to contemplate. If the Earth were our body, we 
would run, not walk, to the doctor's office. We would tell the doctor we felt 
sick, tired, and just not well. Maybe we'd even say we felt like we were 
dying. We would ask what was wrong with us and what could be done to 
help us. 
Now suppose the doctor said: 
You sure do seem sick to me. And we've got evidence of what's 
causing your harms. We're not 100% sure, but most doctors agree 
on the cause. Unfortunately, some of the insurance companies that 
would have to pay for your treatment don't agree that you're really 
sick. They also say that even if you are sick, we don't know what's 
causing it. There is good news, though: We do know how to cure 
you, or at least make you feel better, if we're right about what's 
making you sick. 
What would you say to the doctor? Wouldn't you doubt the medical 
opinion of the companies that have a financial stake in denying that you're 
sick and denying that we know why? Wouldn't you ask for the cure? 
Now let's return to Earth, so to speak. 
For all of the problems I mentioned at the outset, there is a large body of 
scientific evidence showing that the causes of the problems are, at least in 
NEWS, June 5, 2002, http://news.nationalgeographic.comlnews/2002l06/0605_020604_everestclimate. 
htm!. 
18. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, 'THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO AND OTHER STORIES 27 (1927). 
19. See Snows of Kilimanjaro Shrinking, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2002, at A9. 
20. See Media Alert, NASA Earth Observatory, Climate Change Shifts Frost Seasons & Plant 
Growth (Oct. 16, 2000), http://earthobservatory.nasa.govlNewsroomlMediaAlerts/200012000l0164120. 
html. 
21. See James Owen, Early Birds: Is Wanning Changing U.K. Breeding Season?, NAT'L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, June 3, 2003, http://news.nationalgeographic.eomlnewsl2003/06/0603_030603_ 
christmasowls.html. 
22. See Peter Schwartz & Doug Randall, An Abrupt Change Scenario and Its Implications for 
United States National Security, Oct. 2003, available at http://bloodbankers.typepad.comlsubmerging,. 
marketslPentagon.pdf. 
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substantial part, the byproducts (or products) of modem industrial society-
mercury emissions from power plants and other sources, ozone formed from 
car and factory pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil 
fuels. 23 
Granted, our knowledge isn't anywhere near perfect. We often aren't 
sure exactly how high exposures have to be in order to cause harm. We of-
ten don't know what the implications of harms in animals are for humans. 
Lots of problems have more than one cause, which makes things even more 
complicated. But, I submit, we know enough-in each of the scenarios I've 
described and in many others-to put us on our guard. To return to my 
medical analogy, we know enough to know we're not well, and to ask for 
help. 
One of the most pointed expressions of this idea-that we might not 
know it all, but at the same time we know enough to be wary-comes from 
the Berkeley scientist, Tyrone B. Hayes, who has studied the effects of 
atrazine on frogs. 24 Atrazine is one of the most commonly used herbicides 
in this country.25 Hayes has found that it causes reproductive abnormalities 
in frogs.26 Hayes has described the implications of his findings in this way: 
"I'm not saying it's safe for humans .... I'm not saying it's unsafe for hu-
mans. All I'm saying is that it makes hermaphrodites of frogs.'.27 
So we know we don't know everything, but we know enough to be sus-
picious, to be careful, to look for a treatment or even a cure. 
Here's the amazing and wonderful part: we don't have to look that far. 
For each of the problems I identified at the beginning of this Lecture, we 
have-like the hypothetical doctor of my medical analogy-a treatment we 
can offer our ailing patient. Control technologies, process changes, efficient 
technologies, and even, maybe especially, conservation could be pressed 
into service to address the problems I've identified and others I haven't 
mentioned. 
In addition, we know that almost every time we've tried to solve an en-
vironmental problem in the past, good old American ingenuity has come to 
the rescue and provided solutions that are better, more efficient, and less 
expensive than we expected. 
And, to put the last nail in the coffin of the problems I identified at the 
outset, we have plenty of laws on the books that could, in principle, require 
that we use the technologies and other means we possess to solve the prob-
lems we face. The laws, in fact, are so good, so strong, in many cases so 
clear, that people who try to address risks in fields other than environmental 
23. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. loUIS PuB. L. REv. 121, 
121 (2001). 
24. See Weed Killer Deforms Frogs in Sex Organs, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2002, at A19. 
25. /d. 
26. [d. 
27. /d.; see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 223 (2004) (quoting Weed Killer Deforms Frogs in Sex 
Organs, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2002, at AI9). 
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law (like food safety and workplace health and safety) are well-known to 
have a bad case of "statute envy." 
So what's happening? Why are we offering such incompetent health 
care to our planetary patient? Why aren't our laws saving us? 
I believe the answer has to do with the anti-regulatory fever that has 
gripped Congress, the agencies, and many academics in recent years. Each 
time a new regulation is proposed, a now-predictable set of stories and ar-
guments is wheeled out to undermine the case for the new regulation. The 
trouble is, the stories are false, and the arguments are weak-but they're 
still winning the day. 
Let's start with the scare stories. Anybody who has spent time studying 
the regulation of risk in this country has surely run into long, impressive-
looking tables showing how much we spend to save a human life through 
regulation. The numbers are arresting. The most famous of these tables, 
compiled by an economist named John Morrall who works for the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), shows that we often spend tens or hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to save a single human life.28 Once, according to 
Morrall, we even spent $72 billion to save a life through a formaldehyde 
rule issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the 
1980s.29 Morrall concluded that the worst-performing regulations were 
health and environmental regulations.30 Safety regulations-aimed at doing 
things like putting smoke alarms in airplanes-fared much better, according 
to his analysis.31 
There are many problems with this story. One is that many of the rules 
on Morrall's list were never implemented by any regulatory agency, yet 
they continue to be cited by other regulatory observers as part of the case 
against runaway federal regulation.32 Another problem is that many of the 
benefits of the health and environmental rules that Morrall thought cost so 
much were not quantified, and thus, his list understates the benefits of the 
rules in question.33 For example, many environmental rules prevent a certain 
number of cases of human cancer, but they also do many other good 
things-protect against other fatal illnesses; protect against other, nonfatal 
illnesses; and protect other species and ecosystems. But the only benefit 
quantified in Morrall's list for these rules was the prevention of cancer?4 
A last example of the problems with this list is perhaps the most funda-
mental. In his analysis, Morrall employed a controversial technique called 
"discounting.,,35 Discounting is most commonly used for financial decisions 
in which one is trying to compare an amount of money received in one time 
28. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING. supra note 27. at 44-45. 
29. Id. at 43. 
30. /d. at 45. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 47-49. 
33. Id. at 50. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 51. 
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period to an amount of money received in another time period.36 If, say, 
you're trying to figure out whether it's better to receive $100 today or $200 
in ten years, you'll want to know how much interest you'd receive on the 
$100 for ten years so that you can know which amount of money will turn 
out to be better for you. To do this, you convert the $200 you receive in ten 
years from now to "present value" using a discount rate which reflects, 
among other things, the rate of return you would receive on the $100 you 
could choose to receive today. Discounting is essentially compound interest 
in reverse. Just like compound interest can magically convert a small 
amount of money invested today into a very large amount of money in the 
future, discounting similarly can convert a very large amount of money re-
ceived in the future into a very small amount in today's terms. 
Now let's return to Morrall's list. Morrall did not apply a discount rate 
to a financial investment but to human lives saved in the future. 37 As I've 
said, the only quantified benefit of the most costly rules on the list was the 
prevention of cancer. Cancer typically has a long latency period-a long 
interval between exposure to a carcinogen and the manifestation of dis-
ease.38 Morrall discounted the lives saved due to cancer prevention to reflect 
the latency period of the disease.39 Thus, for example, if a rule prevented ten 
cases of cancer that would manifest themselves 25 years from now, Morrall 
discounted those ten cases over 25 years at a very high rate of 10 percent 
per year. This discounting had the effect of trivializing the benefits of the 
most costly rules on his list. In my own work, I have found that if one does 
not apply discounting to the rules on Morrall's list, the cost per life saved of 
those rules drop by several orders of magnitude-by as much as 1,000 
times. 
Why discount? Morrall and other economists have argued that discount-
ing human lives, as if they were a financial investment, is appropriate be-
cause people prefer distant harms to immediate harms.4o But when we're 
talking about risks of harms, this is not at all clearly the case. Many people 
fear cancer much more than they fear other diseases--even diseases that 
might manifest themselves sooner than cancer-and have proven willing to 
pay more to avoid cancer than other diseases.41 
In addition, notice the large value judgments lurking in the seemingly 
arcane decision to discount. Is a life saved due to cancer prevention worth 
less than a life saved via fire safety? Are the lives of people in future gen-
erations worth almost nothing at all? These are the value judgments ob-
scured by the technical debates over discounting. I believe we ought to 
36. [d. at 51-52. 
37. ld. at 52. 
38. /d. at 51. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 191-92. 
41. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Presellt Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2050 
(1999). 
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bring these judgments out into the open and not hide them in a list of num-
bers. 
Here's another scare story used to undermine the case for protective 
regulation. When he was head of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, 
John Graham and several co-authors looked, as John Momall had before 
them, at the costs of various life-saving interventions.42 They found, like 
Morrall, that some interventions cost a great deal. Unlike Morrall, they 
looked not only at regulatory costs, but also at the costs of non-regulatory 
interventions like medical treatments.43 Again, they found that environ-
mental rules fared the worst. 
Graham and his co-author Tammy Tengs tried, in later work, to deter-
mine the opportunity costs of choosing one set of life-saving interventions 
over another.44 What they found was notable: they found that if we shifted 
our life-saving resources to the most cost-effective life-saving interventions, 
we could save 60,000 more lives per year while spending the same amount 
of money.45 Graham has used this figure to accuse regulatory agencies of 
engaging in "statistical murder" when they issue rules with high costS.46 
Graham implies that they are engaging in statistical murder because they 
could be saving more lives by doing something else. 
There are many problems here, as well. Again, many rules on Graham 
and Tengs' list were never issued by any agency; indeed, many were never 
even proposed.47 Of the ninety environmental rules listed by Graham and 
Tengs, seventy-nine were never implemented.48 It's hard to make a case 
against the current regulatory situation based on rules that do not exist. 
Another problem with using the Graham-Tengs Study to argue against 
environmental protection is that the vast majority of the 60,000 lives in their 
analysis were saved due to shifting priorities in the health care and safety 
fields-not the field of environmental regulation.49 This has not stopped 
Graham, however, from using his proposal to argue against environmental 
regulation.5o And these days, his arguments simply can't be ignored: he's 
the head of the regulatory office within the White House that reviews all 
major federal rules before they can be issued.51 And he hasn't hesitated to 
send rules back to the agencies when he thinks they don't jibe with the 
President's policies and priorities.52 
42. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 45. 
43. [d. at 239 n.7. 
44. [d. at 45-47. 
45. [d. at 43,53. 
46. [d. at 43. 
47. [d. at 49. 
48. [d. at 55. 
49. [d. at 53. 
50. Ellen Nakashima, For Bush's Regulatory 'Czar,' The Equation is Persuasion, WASH. POST, 
May 10,2002, at A35. 
51. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 110-11. 
52. See Nakashima, supra note 50. 
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One final scare story merits our attention. I have recently written a book 
on economic analysis of environmental policy with an economist named 
Frank Ackerman. Frank likes to call this last scare story the "regulations of 
mass destruction" story. The claim in this story is that costly regulations are 
actually killing people because they're so costly.53 The theory is that when 
regulations impose costs, individuals end up paying the costs, and when 
they do, they have less money to spend on health care and other things that 
make them healthier and help them live longer. 54 How much does a regula-
tion have to cost to kill someone? Estimates have ranged from as low as 3 
million dollars to as high as 50 million dollars. 55 
What's wrong with this story? There are lots of problems, but I'll focus 
on the most basic. The people who propound the "regulations of mass de-
struction" theory never take into account the fact that regulatory costs don't 
just vanish into a hole. Regulation doesn't require firms to just burn money. 
Instead, regulation requires firms to put on control technology, to change 
production inputs, to opt for efficient equipment, and so forth. All of these 
things cost money, it is true, but the money spent goes to someone-it goes 
to the firms that make the control technologies and other things that lead to 
regulatory compliance. 56 Pollution control is a huge business in this country, 
and the "regulations of mass destruction" story hasn't grasped this basic 
fact. 
Now I'd like to tum away from the scare stories and focus on a different 
kind of argument that has been used to undermine protective regulation in 
recent years. That argument is offered under the banner of so-called "sound 
science." The argument is that courts and agencies have not engaged in 
"sound science" in imposing liability on risk-producing industries and in 
issuing regulations to reduce risk; they have, in fact, used "junk science" in 
doing SO.57 What we need, according to this school of thought, is better sci-
ence before we regulate. 
I think it's worth noting the origins of this line of argument. The focus 
on the mirror images of ''junk science" and "sound science" was something 
dreamed up by none other than the tobacco industry. 58 When it started to 
become clear that smoking threatened not just smokers but the people 
around them who breathed secondhand smoke, the tobacco industry became 
very worried that its longstanding fixation on the voluntary nature of the 
53. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 53-56. 
54. Id. at 56. 
55. Id. at 56-57. 
56. See id. at 58. 
57. See Steven Milloy, Smoggy Statistics, Fox NEWS CHANNEL, Nov. 18 2004, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com!story/O.2933.1390B.OO.html(criticizing statistical study of smog's lethality). 
58. See Jonathan M. Samet & Thomas A. Burke, Turning Science Into Junk: The Tobacco Industry 
and Passive Smoking, 91 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1742, 1742-43 (2001) (discussing the smoking industry's 
attempts to discredit scientific data linking active and secondhand smoke to health problems); see also 
Derek Yach & Stella Aguinaga Bialous, Junking Science to Promote Tobacco, 91 AM. 1. OF PuB. 
HEALTH 1745, 1745-47 (2001) (criticizing the tobacco industry for attempting to cloud scientific evi-
dence linking smoking to health problems). 
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risks of smoking would no longer carry the day.59 So the industry decided to 
start funding attacks on the kind of science (epidemiology and risk assess-
ment) used to demonstrate the harms of secondhand smoke.60 These attacks, 
if successful, would redound to the benefit of the tobacco industry, but they 
wouldn't come directly from the industry itself and, therefore, would appear 
more credible. 
One of the largest fruits of these efforts is something called the "Data 
Quality Act," also known as the "Information Quality Act," a one-paragraph 
measure slipped into an appropriations bill without debate.61 The law directs 
the OMB to issue guidelines to ensure the reliability of information dis-
seminated by federal agencies.62 It seems harmless enough, but in the hands 
of those opposed to protective regulation, it is proving an important tool. 
Many complaints have been filed against agencies for allegedly disseminat-
ing unreliable scientific information.63 Some have been bold indeed. One 
group took the EPA to task for alleged inaccuracies in public comments 
filed by a private groUp.64 Another group recently complained about infor-
mation offered by states with respect to an environmental matter.65 The Data 
Quality Act threatens to divert precious agency resources, requiring them to 
respond to petty and self-interested complaints from the industries regulated 
by the agencies. 
Another product of the "sound science" movement has been an obses-
sion with scientific peer review.66 Let me hasten to say I don't think there's 
anything wrong with peer review. But many agencies, especially the EPA, 
which has come under some of the most withering attacks from the "sound 
science" crowd, already engage in peer review and heavily rely on peer-
reviewed studies in coming to their decisions.67 Requiring even more peer 
review threatens, again, to divert precious agency resources to a task that 
has little to commend it. 
I could go on. There are many unsettling developments underway which 
pose a real danger to the scientific enterprise. We are seeing a large-scale 
infusion of politics into the scientific process. Weare also witnessing quite 
ferocious attacks on the scientists who dare to publish research that makes 
the case for more protective environmental regulation. Tyrone Hayes, the 
59. See Samet & Burke, supra note 58. 
60. See Yach & Bialous, supra note 58. 
61. See SEAN MOULTON & CHERYL GREGORY, OMB WATCH, THE REALITY OF DATA QUALITY 
ACT'S FIRST YEAR: A CORRECTION OF OMB's REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.ombwatch.orglinfo/dataqualityreport.pdf. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 6. 
64. See Industry Targets University Research Under Data Quality Act, INSIDE EPA, Apr. 25, 2003, 
at 13; see also EPA, INFORMATION QUALITY GUIDELINES-REQUESTS FOR CORRECTION (RFC) AND 
REQUESTS FOR RECONSIDERATION (RFR) SUBMIlTED TO EPA, http://www.epa.gov/quality/informa-
tionguidelines/iqg-list.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
65. See EPA, supra note 64. 
66. Karl S. Bourdeau, Information Quality Act Challenges to Flawed Use of Science, 19 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 41, 46-47 (2002). 
67. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLlNG, supra note 27, at 110-15. 
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scientist I mentioned earlier who has shown a link between the herbicide 
atrazine and reproductive abnormalities in frogs, is one of many scientists 
who has suffered destructive attacks on his scientific integrity as a result of 
his research.68 
My basic point is this: the call for "sound science" is a veiled effort to 
undermine the scientific case for protective regulation. Because "sound sci-
ence" sounds so good, so reasonable, it is hard to mount an attack against 
this movement. People who do are accused of being against science itself. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Science has always been the friend 
of environmental protection, and if allowed to maintain its independence, it 
always will be. It's scientists, after all, who told us about mercury in fish, 
the harms of ozone, the disappearing frogs and bees, the retreating glaciers, 
and on down the depressing list I provided at the outset. 
Beyond the scare stories and sound science lie arguments about eco-
nomics-arguments that form the final part of this anti-regulatory "trilogy," 
if you will. These arguments draw upon the scare stories I have described, 
claiming that because regulation has done such a bad job--costing lots of 
money, setting misguided priorities, even killing people-we need a new 
way of deciding what to regulate and how much. And that new approach is 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Professor Sunstein, who will deliver a lecture in this series in the spring, 
has proclaimed the arrival of the "cost-benefit state.,,69 He thinks the debate 
over cost-benefit analysis is over, that the proponents of this analysis have 
won the day, and that we should move on to second-order questions about 
how to make the analysis as good as possible.7o 
I disagree. Not only has cost-benefit analysis not won the day in acade-
mia-I'm living proof of this fact-but it has not won the day in the law. 
Only one of our environmental laws calls for formal cost-benefit analysis, 
including the criterion of "willingness to pay.,,71 That law is the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, with the cost-benefit provision at the bottom of the large 
controversy over EPA's revised standard for arsenic in drinking water sev-
eral years ago.72 
Most of our environmental laws do not require or even allow cost-
benefit analysis. Some prohibit the consideration of costs altogether.73 Most 
allow the consideration of costs but do not contemplate the quantification 
and monetization of environmental benefits. Instead, most environmental 
statutes, in essence, require polluting firms to do their best-to install the 
68. See Kerry Tremain, Profile: Hopping Mad, SIERRA MAG., July-Aug. 2004, at 20,22. 
69. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FuTuRE OF REGULATORY PROTECfION 
ix (2002). 
70. Seeid. 
71. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 168; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-
I (b)(3)(C)(iii) (1996). 
72. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 91-92. 
73. See 1ill DiPasquale, John Graham, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: More Than a 
Watchdog: Regulator Broadens OIRA's Role, FED. TIMES, May 19,2003, at 22. 
HeinOnline -- 57 Ala. L. Rev. 113 2005-2006
2005] Meador Lecture: Risking It All 113 
best control technology or engage in the cleanest production processes they 
can. The fundamental difference between this form of regulation and cost-
benefit analysis is that it is not indifferent between regulating and not regu-
lating; it does not, as cost-benefit analysis does, take a "show me" approach, 
which starts out by assuming that it would be just fine to do nothing in re-
sponse to the environmental problem at hand, so long as the numbers work 
out that way. 
So cost-benefit analysis has not won the day in the statutes on the 
books. But it has gained large influence in recent years due to John Gra-
ham's role as our "regulatory czar.,,74 On his watch, cost-benefit analysis 
has become an important weapon against protective regulation.75 He has 
been more aggressive than any of his predecessors in policing agency rules 
and rejecting rules that do not meet his economic criteria.76 He has asserted 
that he does all of this in the name of "smart regulation.,,77 But the trouble 
is, his office doesn't bother to do economic analysis when the proposal be-
ing considered is for deregulation rather than regulation. In other words, at 
OMB today, cost-benefit analysis continues to be what it has always been-
a one-way street to deregulation. 
Even if cost-benefit analysis were performed evenhandedly, its results 
would tend to skew against environmental protection. There are several 
reasons for this. 
First, cost-benefit analysis requires numbers: it requires the analyst to 
first quantify the costs and benefits of a decision. For benefits of environ-
mental rules, this means quantifying the human lives saved, human illnesses 
averted, and ecological harms prevented by the rules. However, as I have 
said, in many cases the only benefit that can be quantified is the prevention 
of cancer. This means, in the formal cost-benefit analysis, there will be a big 
fat "zero" in the column of benefits other than cancer prevention~ven 
when those benefits are real and important. 
Sometimes cost-benefit analysts will try to address this problem by de-
scribing, in qualitative terms, the unquantified benefits of a rule. But when 
push comes to shove, observers have tended to focus on the numerical bot-
tom line and have left all of the unquantified benefits behind. Indeed, sev-
eral years ago, a federal court overturned the EPA's ban on asbestos partly 
because it concluded that the agency could not rely in any significant way 
on unquantified benefits in justifying the ban.78 
So here we see an initial, large problem with cost-benefit analysis: inso-
far as regulatory benefits must be quantified in order to be taken seriously 
74. Nakashima, supra note 50. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. See Amy Goldstein & Sarah Cohen, Bush Forces a Shift in Regulatory Thrust: OSHA Made 
More Business-Friendly, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,2004, at AI. 
78. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 250 n.41. 
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by regulators, much environmental protection starts off facing an uphill 
battle. 
It only gets worse as the analysis continues. Cost-benefit analysis also 
requires the translation of regulatory costs and benefits into monetary 
terms-the "monetization" of things like life, health, and nature. Since 
lives, health, and nature aren't sold directly in the marketplace, economists 
have had to devise a way to measure their dollar worth indirectly. 
People do pay money to decrease risks in their daily lives. They buy 
safer but more expensive cars. They pay for health club memberships. They 
buy homes in more expensive but less crime-ridden neighborhoods. The 
idea is, if we can figure out, for example, how much the additional safety 
features in a safer car cost, we can come to some conclusion about how 
much people are willing to pay to avoid the risk of injury in an automobile 
accident.7 
Another approach is to study whether workers in risky jobs are paid 
more than workers in less risky jobs, and if so, to figure out how much of 
the extra wage is attributable to the risk alone. so Based on these so-called 
"wage premium" studies, the EPA concluded in the late 1990s that a human 
life was worth a little over six million dollars.S) 
In order for these kinds of studies to be useful, of course, we need to 
know several things. We need to know that the people who are making 
these indirect tradeoffs between money and risk actually know the tradeoffs 
they face, understand the risks, and have, nonetheless, decided to make a 
tradeoff.s2 We need to know that they made this choice freely-that they 
weren't pressed by dire economic circumstances, for instance, to take on a 
dangerous job. Otherwise, instead of measuring "willingness to pay," we 
might only be measuring ability to pay. 
To understand other problems with valuing life in monetary terms, there 
is some terminology you must know. When economists talk about the value 
of preventing death, they say they are preventing the loss of so-called "sta-
tistical lives."s3 So the six-million-dollar value I mentioned would be re-
ferred to as the value of a "statistical" life. What does this mean? 
To explain this idea, I have to back up. Imagine that we are trying to 
figure out the value of life and death itself. Imagine that someone asks you 
how much you would be willing to pay in order to avoid having that person 
kill you. My strong suspicion is that your answer would depend completely 
on how much money you have in the bank to offer that person. Your an-
swer, in other words, would reflect ability rather than willingness to pay. If 
you have $100 and Bill Gates has billions, I do not believe this means you 
value your own life less than Bill Gates values his. 
79. See id. at 2. 
80. See id. at 2, 75. 
81. See id. at 61. 
82. Id. at 76-77. 
83. Id. at 67. 
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Even if you turn the question around, problems remain. Suppose the 
person asks you how much you are willing to accept in order to allow that 
person to kill you. I suspect that most people would say, "Are you crazy? 
No thanks. No deal. I'm not in the market for death right now." 
Economists have recognized this problem for some time. Years ago 
they came up with an answer: the concept of statistical life. Instead of think-
ing about the value of life in terms of life itself, economists began to think 
about the value of small risks to life.84 
The way the process works is this. For simplicity's sake, suppose 100 
people each face an increased risk of dying of 11100. Suppose each person 
is willing to pay $1 to avoid this risk. In this case, we would say that the 
value of the "statistical life" in question is $100: 100 people pay a total of 
$100 to avoid the death of one person. A "statistical life" is an aggregation 
of life-threatening risks in a population such that, if the risk is not avoided, 
one person will die as a result of the risk. 85 
Economists will tell you that there is a large difference between a life 
and a "statistical" life. They will tell you that valuing statistical life in terms 
of money is perfectly fine and involves no moral dilemma, even if valuing 
non-statistical lives in terms of money would be morally problematic. If I 
ask you how much you will pay me to avoid having me kill you, you will 
likely not just think I have made a faux pas; you will likely think I have 
misunderstood some of the basic norms that underlie a civilized society. 
But what makes statistical lives different from non-statistical lives? 
Only the inability to identify the people who have died. When 100 people 
each face an extra 11100 risk of cancer due to exposure to a chemical, we 
can almost never identify who ended up being the unlucky one to die from 
that exposure. When economists talk about "statistical" lives, they are refer-
ring to the fact that we cannot know who will end up dying if we decide it's 
not worth it to protect them. 
I believe this inability to identify the people who have died from envi-
ronmental exposures is not a morally relevant consideration. In reality, there 
are no "statistical" people. When a person dies, even if we don't know why, 
she really dies; her family really grieves; her friends really mourn her loss. 
The modifier "statistical" makes it seem as though she is a phantom, a 
ghost, not real. But this is false. 
Thus the contrivance of "statistical life" glosses over, but does not re-
solve, the fundamental moral dilemmas at the heart of deciding whether one 
person will be allowed to harm another because of economic expediency. 
There are many other problems with cost-benefit analysis in the context 
of environmental protection. Let me mention another one, a big one, in clos-
ing. 
84. See id. 
85. [d. at 68. 
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Many of the environmental problems we face today are potential, im-
minent, or even ongoing catastrophes. The contamination and depletion of 
our fisheries, the large-scale consequences of global warming, the loss of 
biodiversity-all of these are catastrophic matters. They are catastrophic 
because of their scope and also because of their irreversibility; when the last 
frog dies, we cannot make a new one. 
Economics is not good at advising us about how to deal with catastro-
phes. Economics finds its most comfortable home at the margins of prob-
lems, figuring out how to do something most cheaply, identifying incentives 
that will influence behavior at the margin, and determining price fluctua-
tions based on rather small changes in supply. When outcomes are discon-
tinuous, irreversible, or disastrous, economic analysis will lead us astray. 
I began by identifying some of the enormous and terrible environmental 
problems we face today. I've tried to solve the mystery of why we aren't 
doing more about them by telling you about the scare stories, unsound sci-
ence, and misplaced economics that have been used to argue against protec-
tive regulation. I'd like to close on an optimistic note-a genuinely optimis-
tic note. 
I will take just one of the problems I mentioned at the outset, and I will 
tell you how we might begin to solve it using just the laws and scientific 
knowledge we have today. The problem is mercury pollution. Mercury con-
tamination is responsible for about tmee-quarters of the fish advisories I 
described.86 Mercury accumulates in fish; we eat the fish; we then are ex-
posed to mercury and its effects.87 
If we lower mercury emissions, there is good evidence we can see a 
rapid and positive response. A recent study in the Everglades looked at mer-
cury concentrations in fish before and after new restrictions on incinerators 
went into effect.88 Mercury levels in the fish dropped noticeably within just 
a couple of years, and they dropped in the area around the plants affected by 
the new restrictions.89 Also, evidence from Canada is showing us that "new" 
mercury deposition (the kind prevented by new regulations) is the most bio-
available to fish, and thus, the most risky to us-to put the point positively, 
to get rid of new deposition is to get rid of the mercury that's most threaten-
ing to our health.90 There is more good news: companies expecting a new 
rule for mercury from power plants have been feverishly working to de-
velop new technologies for controlling mercury.91 And if these new tech-
86. See U.s. Geological Survey, Fish Advisories Nationwide, Nov. 27, 2002, http://minerals.usgs. 
gov/mercury/advisories.html. 
87. See Heinzerling, supra note 41, at n.63. 
88. See Press Release, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Florida Everglades Study 
Reveals Decline in Mercury Levels (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary 
Inewsl2oo3/novIII06.htm. 
89. [d. 
90. See The Academy of Natural Sciences, New Mercury Becomes Bioavailable Faster (Apr. 24, 
2002), http://www.acnatsci.orglpress/mercury.html. 
91. Press Release, Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, New NESCAUM Report 
Shows Mercury Controls Now Feasible: U.S. EPA Urged to Act (Sept. 6, 2000), available at 
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nologies for some reason aren't used, then the alternative technologies we 
would use to control mercury also control other harmful air pollutants. 
And we already have a law on the books, section 112 of the Clean Air 
Act, which clearly instructs the EPA to set a strict new rule for mercury in 
the circumstances in which we find ourselves.92 Thus, both current science 
and current law are aligned in a way to make us hopeful about what we can 
do to solve the mercury problem. 
Unfortunately, so far the EPA has not seen it this way, and it has pro-
posed a terribly weak rule for mercury from power plants which might not 
produce any new restrictions on mercury for over almost fifteen years.93 It's 
interesting to note that all the scare stories, arguments about sound science, 
and economic claims I've discussed today have been deployed in defense of 
this bad rule. 
I think we should try it my way instead. Be attentive to the problems we 
face. Be happy and hopeful when there's a treatment for them. And try, as 
best you can, to ignore--or better yet, rebut the arguments of-the skeptics 
who tell us we're not sick, or if we are no one knows why, or if they do, we 
shouldn't reach for a cure. 
http://bronze.nescaum.orglairtopics/mercury/prt:J906000hg-innov-tech-press-release.pdf. 
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
93. See EPA, FACT SHEET: EPA PROPOSES OPTIONS FOR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING MERCURY 
EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/mercuryrule/h/L 
factsheetl_29 _04.pdf. 
